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Disabled Meanings: A Comparison of the
Definitions of "Disability" in the British
Disability Discrimination Act of 1995 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
BYNICK WENBOURNE*
I. Introduction
The Disability Discrimination Act (DDA),' which came into
force in December, 1996, marked an important turning point in the
history of disability civil rights in Great Britain. The Act replaced a
quota system established in 1944 by the Disabled Persons
(Employment) Act.2 The DDA was the first legislation in Europe to
specifically acknowledge that disabled people suffer from
discrimination in a number of fields and public services including
employment, education and transportation
However, people across the political spectrum have criticized the
DDA. Despite being the most radical legislation covering disability
discrimination in Europe, many disability-rights groups have argued
* J.D., Hastings College of the Law, 2000; B.A. with honors, University of
Oxford (St. Edmund Hall).
1. Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50 (Eng.).
2. Disabled Persons (Employment) Act, 1944, ch. 10, §§ 9-11, vol. 16 (Eng.).
The Disabled Persons Act required employers to meet a quota of 3% disabled
employees. The DDA specifically overturned the Disabled Persons (Employment)
Act. Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50 (Eng.).
3. Previous legislation in Great Britain regarded only employment. See
Disabled Persons (Employment) Act, 1944, ch. 10, §§ 9-11, (Eng.). The Disability
Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50 (Eng.) in contrast deals with a broader range of
discrimination. Part II of the Act deals with employment and is the focus of this
note. Part III deals with discrimination with regard to the right of access to goods,
facilities and services and the disposal of or management of premises. Part IV deals
with education and Part V with public transportation.
4. For a comparison of disability discrimination in Europe with reference also to
the Americans with Disabilities Act, see Lisa Waddingtion, Reassessing the
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forcibly that the DDA is flawed, pointing in particular to the fact that
the Act covers less than 10% of employers in Great Britain, and
highlighting its weak enforcement mechanisms.' Yet, some business
interests and right-wing commentators have also aired their concerns
about a statute they believe is too intrusive and too financially
burdensome on businesses trying to compete in cut-throat markets.6
Employment of People with Disabilities in Europe: from Quotas to Anti-
Discrimination Laws, 18 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 62 (1996).
5. When the Labour Government reduced the threshold of employers covered
from those with 20 employees to those with 15, disability groups said that the change
was derisory, leaving 92.5% of employers beyond the Act. See Nick Pandya, New
Rights for the Disabled Unveiled, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 12, 1998, at 20. Lord
Lester, a civil rights lawyer, called the original legislation "a colander, rather than a
binding code" because it was "riddled with vague, slippery and elusive exceptions."
See Alison Clarke, Disability Act May Get Some Muscle, INDEPENDENT (London),
Nov. 27, 1997, at C15. For an example of criticism of the legislation as proposed in
1995 and how it would not address the quotidian needs of the disabled, see Sir John
Hannan et. al., Just Three Wishes: Campaigners from Sharply Differing Backgrounds
Offer Perspectives on What Has Been Achieved and What Remains to Be Done,
OBSERVER (London), May 7, 1995, at S18. A proposed government bill to create
strong enforcement and investigative mechanisms will shortly come before
Parliament. A government bill creating the Disability Rights Commission was
published in December, 1998. See David Brindle, Disabled to Get Legal Rights
Lever, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 5, 1998, at 9. For a summary of the perceived
weaknesses of the DDA written before the Act came into force, see Lisa
Waddingtion, Reassessing the Employment of People with Disabilities in Europe:
From Quotas to Anti-Discrimination Laws, 18 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 62, 84-88 (1996). A
brief summary of the debate surrounding the enforcement of the DDA provides
useful background for the purpose of this note. The lack of an enforcement agency
to investigate and enforce the provisions of the Act was particularly glaring as Acts
regulating sex and race discrimination in the United Kingdom did include powerful
enforcement mechanisms. See Fred Heddell, Disability: Change It from the Top,
GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 25, 1996, at 9. Moreover, after the DDA came into
force, it became clear that victims of discrimination based on disability were not
receiving as much compensation as those discriminated against on the basis of race or
gender. See Rajeev Syal, Race Awards Double Those Paid to Disabled, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 20, 1998, at 5. This state of affairs has been attributed
to the fact that many applicants are not represented by counsel and to the absence of
an enforcement mechanism for the DDA. See Peter Baker, Workplace: Given the
Sack for a Club Foot, OBSERVER (London), Aug. 10, 1997, at 8.
6. Some business groups also feared the advent of a culture of litigation in
Britain. Moreover, considerable apprehension arose from the definition of
"disability" in the proposed legislation with concern centering on the possible
inclusion of stress within the meaning of "disability." See David Brindle, Disability:
A Shaky Step Forward, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 27, 1996, at 6; see also, Auberon
Waugh, Way of the World: The Latest Horror, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 4,
1996, at 21 ("The cost and loss of efficiency will be bad enough. I predict that there
will also arise a new army of the professionally disabled, who will make it their
business to be turned down for job after job and live happily on the compensation. I
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During the legislative process, members of the opposition
Labour Party also took exception to the legislation proposed and
enacted by the then Conservative government.7 Labour politicians
echoed the concerns of disabled activists in highlighting the Act's
weak enforcement mechanism.8  New Labour is currently in
government and is undertaking a review of the DDA, which has
included the publication of a proposed bill in December, 1998.9
This bill seeks to create the Disability Discrimination
Commission (DDC) with investigative and enforcement powers."0
The provisions of the bill are intended to remedy the enforcement
problems of the DDA and it is the first disability discrimination
legislation undertaken by the New Labour government.1 The review
of disability discrimination provisions addressed by the current
Labour Government also includes an assessment of the definition of
disability as provided by the DDA. 2
This note will compare the DDA with its United States
counterpart, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),3 which is
suppose it would be asking too much of any government that it should simply stop
passing new laws. Could they not sometimes think twice before inflicting the next
fashionable idiocy on us?").
7. See Mark Henderson, Disabled Attack Labour Review of Rights Law, TIMES
(London), Sept. 9, 1998, at 8.
8. See id.
9. In March, 1998, the government published a Green Paper outlining its
proposals for reviewing the DDA. In July, 1998, the government published a White
Paper describing plans to create a commission with investigation and enforcement
powers. At the same time, a government task force was considering changes to the
definition of "disabled" within the Act. See, David Brindle, Disabled People to Get
Rights Body, GUARDIAN (London), July 22, 1998, at 12. A government bill
proposing the creation of the Disability Rights Commission was published in
December, 1998. See id. at 9.
10. See id.
11. See id. As proposed in the bill, the DDC will be "akin" to other civil rights
commissions in Great Britain. See id. However, in light of the changing nature of
industrial relations, the new commission will not be identical to the Equal
Opportunity Commission and the Commission for Racial Equality. See id. The
DDC will be able to enforce legally binding agreements on companies and others
found in breach of the DDA. See id. The DDC will have the power to draft
statutory agreements by an employer to undertake to put right any breach of the law
within a time limit in return for a promise to stop any further investigation and
enforcement action. See id.
12. See id. at 12.
13. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990). The
provisions of the ADA relevant to employment are found in sections 12101 to 12102,
12111 to 12117, and 12201 to 12213, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
1999]
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widely regarded as the most comprehensive and radical legislation of
its kind in the world. 14 This note will focus on how the two statutes
and their respective, emerging bodies of case law define "disability."
Such a comparison of the ADA and the DDA will shed light on some
of the strengths and weaknesses of the definition the DDA gives to
disability at a time when the New Labour government conducts an
initial review of its definition in the Act.
This note begins with an analysis of how the DDA and its case
law defines the term "disability." The second section then considers
the definition of "disability" under the ADA and its jurisprudence.
The final section argues that the DDA compares poorly with its
American counterpart because the DDA's definition of "disability" is
less broad and less flexible.
One caveat should be noted at the outset. The DDA is a
relatively new act. As a result, there has been neither the time nor
the opportunity for industrial tribunals to develop a coherent
jurisprudence for it.16 In contrast, the ADA is five years older and its
case law is more developed. Moreover, American courts have also
been able to draw upon case law generated by the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973,"7 an act similar to the ADA which applied to government
workers. The jurisprudence that has been generated by the DDA,
however, has added to the debate regarding the future of the Act.
H. Definitions of Disability
A. Great Britain
Under the DDA an individual is disabled if he "has a physical or
mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse
14. See, e.g., Lisa Waddingtion, Reassessing the Employment of People with
Disabilities in Europe: From Quotas to Anti-Discrimination Laws, 18 CoMP. LAB.
L.J. 62, 99 (1996).
15. The government plans to replace the existing National Discrimination
Council, which had an advisory role, with a Disability Rights Commission, which,
unlike its predecessor, will also have investigatory and enforcement powers. See
David Brindle, Disabled to Get Legal Rights Lever, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 5,
1998, at 9. At the time of writing it was unclear whether legislation redefining
disability under the Act was imminent.
16. For a discussion of British procedure in employment law cases, particularly
the use of industrial tribunals, see Michael Mankes, Combating Individual
Employment Discrimination in the United States and Great Britain: A Novel Remedial
Approach, 16 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 67, 86-99 (1994).
17. Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 794.
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effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities."18 The
definition is complex and its terms are inextricably connected.
However, it is helpful to break the definition down as follows: (1)
impairment, (2) substantial, (3) long-term, (4) adverse effect, and (5)
normal day-to-day activities.
1. Impairment
An impairment may be either physical or mental. 9 The DDA
does not consider alcoholism or drug addiction as disabilities.
However, the effects of these conditions, such as liver damage caused
by alcoholism, are considered impairments under the Act. The term
"mental impairment" "includes an impairment resulting from or
consisting of a mental illness only if the illness is a clinically well-
recognized illness."2' One Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT)
suggested a tribunal should see whether the illness is mentioned in
the World Health Organization's International Classification of
Diseases if there is any doubt as to whether a mental illness is
clinically well recognized.2'
2. Substantial
The word "substantial" means an effect that is more than minor
for the purposes of the Act.' Tribunal decisions are not clear about
exactly what they measure. For example, in a recent appeal, an
employer terminated a patent examiner suffering from paranoid
schizophrenia following complaints about his "thought broadcasting"
from fellow employees. 3  The employee was not taking proper
medication when he was fired.24 The EAT held that a tribunal should
examine how the individual's abilities were affected at the relevant
time (i.e., when he was fired) and then while on medication, and that
it should then consider the effects there would have been but for the
medication (the deduced effects).2 Next, a tribunal should consider
18. Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50, § 1 (1) 9 (Eng.).
19. Id.
20. Id. at sched. 1 § 1 (1) 1-(1).
21. See Russell et al., Whether Worker Is Disabled, TIMES (London), Nov. 11,
1998, at 40.
22. 265 H.C. OmcICIAL REP. (6th ser.) 174 (Oct. 31, 1995) (statement of Alistair
Burt, Minister for Social Security and Disabled People).
23. See Russell et al., supra note 21.
24. See id.
25. See id.
1999]
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whether the actual and deduced effects on the individual's ability to
carry out normal day-to-day activities were clearly more than trivial.26
3. Long-Term
The effect of an impairment is long-term if: (1) it has lasted at
least 12 months; (2) the period for which it lasts is likely to be at least
12 months; or (3) it is likely to last for the rest of the life of the person
affected.27 Where an impairment ceases to have a substantial adverse
effect; it will still qualify if it is likely to recur.8 The likeliness of
recurrence rather than the frequency of recurrence is thus the main
factor to be considered.29
4. Adverse Effect
When determining adverse effect, a tribunal should consider
what the individual either cannot do or can do only with difficulty,
not what the individual can do.' The fact that the individual can
carry out normal day-to-day activities does not therefore end the
inquiry. A tribunal must consider the effect the disability has on the
individual's ability to carry out these activities. The fact that an
individual manages to carry out such activities does not mean that his
overall ability to carry them out has not been impaired.3
A tribunal considers the adverse effect of an impairment without
reference to the mitigating effect of medical treatment or the use of
prosthetic devices." However, the impairment of a person's sight
correctable by glasses or lenses is not included. Thus, the thorny
issue of whether one should consider the mitigating effect of
corrective lenses is moot under the DDA.
The DDA considers an individual with a progressive condition
which hinders his or her ability to carry out normal day-to-day
activities, such as symptomatic HIV, to be adversely and substantially
affected if the condition is likely to result in having an adverse or
26. See id.
27. See Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50, sched. 1, § 1(1) 1-(1) (Eng.).
28. See id. at sched. 1, § 1(1) 2-(2).
29. See id.
30. See Russell et al., supra note 21.
31. See id.
32. See Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50, sched. 1, § 1(1) 6-(1) to §
1(1) 6-(2) (Eng.).
33. See id. at sched. 1, §1(1) 6-(3)(a).
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substantial impairment
5. Normal Day-to-Day Activities
"Normal day-to-day activities" are defined exclusively in the
Act. 5 They are mobility; manual dexterity; physical coordination;
continence; the ability to lift, carry or otherwise move everyday
objects; speech, hearing or eyesight; memory or ability to concentrate,
learn or understand; and the ability to perceive the risk of physical
danger36 An EAT has held that an individual's abilities to cope at
home, get to work effectively and satisfactorily carry out his or her
work-all normal day-to-day activities under the Act-do not mean
that he or she is not disabled if other normal day-to-day activities are
affected.' The EAT noted that the individual could not concentrate
properly, which affected his work performance.' In the action below,
a tribunal had held that it had no jurisdiction because the individual
could satisfactorily perform day-to-day tasks despite some effect on
the individual's ability to concentrate.39 The EAT made clear that the
effect of the paranoid schizophrenia on the individual's concentration
sufficiently met the normal day-to-day activity standard because the
ability to concentrate was one of the normal day-to-day activities
enumerated in the Act.' The EAT held that there was no need to go
further if one of the enumerated capacities had been impaired.41
Thus, the individual's ability to perform domestic duties was not
relevant because the individual's ability to concentrate was
impaired.42 However, the EAT noted that the effect of a disability on
a person's ability to conduct his daily life may have a cumulative
effect.43
The definition of disability under the DDA still turns on the
individual's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.44 It does
34. Id. at sched. 1, §1(1) 8-(1).
35. Id. at sched. 1, §1(1) 4-(1).
36. See id.
37. See Russell et al., supra note 21.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50, sched. 1, § 1(1) 4-(1) (Eng.).
1999]
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not turn on whether the individual is able to do his or her job.45 Work
is not one of the normal day-to-day activities enumerated under the
Act 6  One employee was unable to lift the heavy bags his job
required and was fired for being unable to carry out his duties.47 The
EAT' held that the employer had not discriminated against the
employee because the employee's condition did not affect his ability
to lift everyday objects and he could carry out normal day-to-day
activities.49 The wording of the DDA supports the holding of the
EAT in this case. The DDA lists the ability to lift, carry or otherwise
move everyday objects as a day-to-day activity.0 Normal day-to-day
activities manifestly do not, therefore, include the ability to lift heavy
objects because this activity is not one of the enumerated normal day-
to-day activities covered by the Act." An individual whose work
involves a normal day-to-day activity as defined in the Act who is
unable to perform this activity is disabled under the Act." However,
an individual who has an impairment which affects his or her ability
to work, but not his or her ability to carry out the enumerated normal
day-to-day activities, is not disabled under the Act."
Thus, under the DDA, an individual's capacity to work is only
relevant to the definition of disability when used to illustrate his or
her inability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, such as the
ability to concentrate. 4 Therefore, an individual may not be covered
by the Act despite having a physical or mental impairment, for
example the inability to lift heavy bags, that has a substantial and
long-term adverse effect on his or her employment.5 However, it is
equally true that an individual may be disabled under the Act for the
purposes of its employment provisions without necessarily having an
impairment that has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. See David Murby, Disability Legislation, Trials and Tribulation, HERALD
(U.K.), Nov. 11, 1998, at 24.
48. Employment Appeals Tribunals convene in different parts of the country and
may be differently constituted. See id.
49. See id.
50. Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50, sched. 1, § 1(1) 4-(1) (Eng.).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Murby, supra note 47.
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or her employment. 6 For example, one may have an impairment that
has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on one's ability to lift
every day objects but one may be in a form of employment that does
not require one to lift such objects.
B. United States
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),57 an
individual is covered by the Act if he or she satisfies any one of three
definitions.8 An individual is disabled if he or she (1) has a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual; (2) has a record of such
impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 9
Although there are three ways an individual can be considered
disabled under the meaning of the Act, the definition of disability as
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities" is central to all three definitions of
an individual with a disability.'
An individual with a disability must also be a qualified individual
who can perform the essential functions of the job concerned in order
to come under the ambit of the Act.6' An individual with a disability
may perform these essential functions with or without reasonable
accommodations.6' The concept of qualified individuals who can
perform the essential functions of a position with or without
reasonable accommodations thus further defines those who are
covered under the Act.
The ADA's definition of disability is best understood when
broken down as follows: (1) impairment; (2) substantially limits; (3)
major life activities; (4) qualified individual; (5) essential functions;
(6) reasonable accommodations; (7) record of impairment; and (8)
regarded as having such impairment. This will be the order presented
in this section.
56. Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50, sched. 1, § 1(1) 4-(1) (Eng.).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
58. Id. § 12102(2).
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
6Z Id.
1999]
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1. Impairment
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)' has
defined "physical or mental impairment" as (1) any physiological
disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech
organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic
and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine or (2) any mental or physiological
disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.' 4
Impairments do not include physical, psychological, environmental,
cultural, or economic characteristics that are not impairments. 
6
The Supreme Court has held asymptomatic HIV is an
impairment for the purposes of the Act. 6 The Court noted that "HIV
infection must be regarded as a physiological disorder with a constant
and detrimental effect on the infected person's hemic and lymphatic
systems from the moment of infection."'67
2. Substantially Limits
An individual's impairment must be one that substantially limits
a major life activity to be covered by the Actf. The EEOC has
defined "substantially limits" as (1) unable to perform a major life
activity that the average person in the population can perform or (2)
significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the
average person in the general population can perform that same
major life activity.' Thus, an individual is disabled if an impairment
either prevents the performance of a major life activity or if it
significantly restricts the performance of a major life activity."
The EEOC has also provided the following factors to determine
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 provides that the EEOC will issue regulations for the
employment title of the Act.
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
65. Id.
66. See Bragdon v. Abbott 118 S. Ct. 2196,2196 (1998).
67. Id. at 2199.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1).
70. See id.
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whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity:
the nature and severity of the impairment; the duration or expected
duration of the impairment; and the permanent or long term impact,
or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from
the impairment.7 "Duration" refers to the length of time an
impairment persists and "impact" refers to the residual effects of an
impairment n
The definition of "substantial" is often fact-based. In Bragdon,
the Supreme Court held that an 8% risk of transmitting HIV met the
substantial requirement. 3  The Supreme Court has also held that
when an impairment is serious enough to require hospitalization, it is
"a fact more than sufficient to establish that one or more [of the
individual's] major life activities were substantially limited."'74
The Supreme Court has recently decided that courts should take
mitigating factors into account when considering impairment.
Previously, circuit and district courts generally followed EEOC
guidelines under which the existence of an impairment was
considered without regard to mitigating measure such as medicines or
prosthetic devices.75 Thus, an individual with epilepsy was considered
to have an impairment even if the symptoms were completely
controlled by medicine.76 However, recent Supreme Court decisions
overturned these cases. Now, courts determine whether an
individual's impairment substantially limits a major life activity by
considering the mitigating measures he or she employs.' Thus, the
Court decided employees who wear corrective eyeglasses or contact
lenses are not disabled under the ADA.78 Moreover, monocularity is
not a disability per se, but should be considered on a case by case
71. See id.
72. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20).
73. 118 S. Ct. at 2196.
74. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1986); see also
Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998). In
Bartlett, the court held that the plaintiff was substantially limited in the major
activities of reading and learning. The defendant's expert had stated that the plaintiff
did not have a learning disability because she scored higher than the 30th percentile
on a reading test. However, the court held that the proper comparator was the
manner and condition under which the average person can read or learn. Under this
approach, the plaintiff did have a learning disability.
75. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
76. See id.
77. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
78. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
1999]
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basis taking into account the extent of compensating adjustments.79
In the Court's view, there is no difference between measures
undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and eyeglasses, and
measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body's
own systems.8° In Albertsons' v. Kirkinburg, an individual who
effectively compensated for his monocularity without artificial aids
was not an individual with a disability under the Act." All individuals
must prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the
limitation in terms of their own experience is substantial." Thus, a
diabetic whose illness does not impair his or her daily activities would
not be considered disabled under the Act.
When alleging the major life activity of working, the ADA's
substantial limitation requirement assumes greater significance than
for other major life activities. For an impairment to substantially
limit one's ability to work, it must not merely prevent one from
working at a particular job; it must prevent one from working at a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.' The inability
to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of working.8 With respect to the
major life activity of working, the EEOC Regulations state that
"substantially limits" means significantly restricted in the ability to
perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills and abilities.' For example, if an individual has a back
condition that prevents the individual from performing heavy labor
jobs, then he or she is substantially limited in the major life activity of
working because he or she cannot perform a class of jobs by virtue of
the individual impairment.8s
Thus, the Seventh Circuit recently held that a plaintiff did not
79. See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Holihan v. Lucky Stores, 87 F.3d 362, 366 (1996); see also Price v.
National Bd. of Med. Examiners, 966 F. Supp. 419 (1997) (holding that plaintiffs, who
suffered from ADHD, were not substantially limited in their ability to learn because
they were able to learn as well as or better than the average person in the
community).
84. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3).
85. Id.
86. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20).
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show that she was significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobsY The plaintiff claimed
that her ability to work as a psychotherapist was substantially limited
by her impairment, ADD, since she could not keep up with her
backlog of dictation as her job required.n The court held that the
plaintiff had only shown that she was unable to perform the job at
defendant's establishment." She had not shown she was precluded
from holding other comparable positions as a therapist because other
institutions may not require such dictation records.'
Even if one impairment does not substantially limit a major life
activity, multiple impairments that combine to substantially limit one
or more of an individuals' major life activities also constitute a
disability under the Act.9'
3. Major Life Activity
The term "major life activity" means a function such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, breathing,
learning, and working.' However, this list is not exhaustive." The
EEOC has stated that other activities qualify as major life activities,
such as sitting, standing, lifting and reaching.94 The Seventh Circuit,
though acknowledging that speaking is a major life activity, held that
the inability to dictate is not a major life activity. 5 The court noted
that the individual concerned was not limited in the ability to
communicate in the course of her employment."'
The EEOC has not indicated that reproduction is a major life
activity.' However, in Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court held
that reproduction "falls well within the phrase 'major life activity." ''
In Bragdon, the petitioner had argued that the ADA only covered
those aspects of a person's life that have a public, economic or daily
87. See Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 1997).
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20).
92. See id. § 1630.2(i).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See Davidson, 133 F.3d at 507.
96. See id.
97. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
98. 524 U.S. at 638.
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character.9 The Court noted, however, that "the breadth of the term
['major life activity'] confounds the attempt to limit its construction in
this manner."' ° Indeed, "reproduction could not be regarded as any
less important than working and learning."' ' The Bragdon decision
demonstrates the flexibility a court has in defining "major life
activity" under the ADA. However, the definition of a major life
activity is amorphous. For example, the First Circuit has held that the
ability to get along with others is not a major life activity." The court
noted that "while such an ability is a skill to be prized, it is different in
kind from breathing or walking, two exemplars which are used in the
regulations.'1 3
The EEOC guidelines note that if "an individual is not
substantially limited with respect to any other major life activity, the
individual's ability to perform the major life activity of working
should be considered."'" These guidelines thus suggest that work
should be used as a major life activity only as a last resort.
4. Qualified Individuals with Disabilities
Those who meet the definition of "disabled" under the Act must
also be qualified individuals in order to come under the ambit of the
ADA.' 5 A qualified individual with a disability means an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the job. 6 The EEOC has defined
"qualified individual with a disability" as an "individual with a
disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and
other job-related requirements of the employment position such
individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such
position. ' ' "°
The determination of whether an individual with a disability is
qualified should be made in two steps." First, one should consider
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997).
103. Id. at 15.
104. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
106. See id.
107. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (emphasis added).
108. See id.
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whether the individual with a disability is otherwise qualified.1" This
involves an inquiry into whether the individual satisfies the
prerequisites for the position. Such an inquiry would include
considering whether the individual possesses the appropriate
educational level, employment experience, and skills for the position
at hand."' Second, one should consider whether or not the individual
can perform the essential functions of the position with or without
reasonable accommodation."' The second step is considered below.
5. Essential Functions
The purpose of considering whether or not the individual can
perform the essential functions of the position is to ensure that
individuals with disabilities who can perform the essential functions
of the position are not denied employment because they cannot
perform the marginal functions of the position."'
The EEOC has defined "essential functions" as "the
fundamental job duties of the employment position." '' A job
function can be considered essential for one of the following three
reasons: (1) a function might be essential if the position exists to
perform that function; (2) a function might be essential if there are a
limited number of employees among whom that job function may be
distributed; and (3) a function might be essential if it is so highly
specialized that "the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her
expertise or ability to perform the particular function."'1 4
Under the ADA, courts must consider employer judgment when
considering what functions of a job are the essential functions of that
employment position."5 If an employer has a written description
before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, courts
should consider this description evidence and give it deference when
determining the job's essential functions. 6 Other factors that may be
considered include the amount of time spent on the job performing
the function; the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. § 1630.2(n).
114. Id.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
116. See id.
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perform the function; the terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
the work experience of past incumbents in the job; and the current
work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.' These factors are
not exhaustive and other relevant factors may be considered.'
An inquiry into whether job functions are essential should not
second guess an employer's business judgment with regard to
qualitative or quantitative production standards."9 The EEOC's
interpretive guidance provides an illustration: "If an employer
requires its typists to be able to accurately type 75 words per minute,
it will not be called upon to explain why an inaccurate work product,
or a typing speed of 65 words per minute, would not be adequate.
120
However, the employer may have to show that it actually imposes
121such requirements on its employees in fact and not merely on paper.
6. Reasonable Accommodations
A reasonable accommodation is any change in the work
environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables
an individual with a disability to enjoy employment opportunities.' "
Under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation may include (1)
making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities and (2) job restructuring, part-
time work or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition of or modification to equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities."3
This list is not exhaustive and the EEOC regulations further
define reasonable accommodation as (1) modifications or
adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified
117. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See id. § 1630.2(o). For different approaches to the application of reasonable
accommodation and which party has the burden of proof, see Bultemeyer v. Fort
Wayne Community Sch., 100 F.3d 1281 (7th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Principal Fin.
Group, 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996); Miller v. National Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627 (8th Cir.
1995); Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 941 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1991).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
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applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such
qualified applicant desires; (2) modifications or adjustments to the
work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which
the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a
qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential function
of that position; or (3) modifications or adjustments that enable a
covered entity's employee with a disability to enjoy the benefits and
privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated
employees without disabilities." The EEOC notes other
accommodations could include permitting the use of accrued paid
leave or providing additional unpaid leave for necessary treatment
and the use of a page turner for an employee with no hands."z
According to the EEOC, an employer may accomplish job structuring
by reallocating nonessential or marginal job functions.26 However, an
employer is not required to reallocate essential job functions." An
employer or other covered entity may also restructure a job by
altering when and/or how an essential function is performed."
Reassignment to a vacant position, though a possible reasonable
accommodation, should only be considered when accommodation
within the individual's current position would pose an undue
hardship. '29
7. Record of Such Impairment
This provision was intended to ensure that people are not
discriminated against because of a history of disability or because
they have been misclassified as disabled. 3' The recorded impairment
must be one that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.131
According to the EEOC, an individual with a record of a
substantially limiting condition is protected when he or she has a
history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
124. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. § 1630.2(k).
131. See id.
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activities." In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, the
Supreme Court held that a teacher's hospitalization for tuberculosis
substantially limited one or more of her major life activities and was
sufficient to establish a record of impairment."'
8. Regarded as Having Such an Impairment
If an individual has neither a physical nor a mental impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity nor a record of such
impairment, he or she may still be "regarded as" having such an
impairment."4 The Supreme Court has articulated the rationale
behind this provision (in the context of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973): "[A]n impairment might not diminish a person's physical or
mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that
person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others
to the impairment."'3  Moreover, "Congress acknowledged that
society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases
are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from
actual impairment.' 6
According to the EEOC, one is regarded as having a
substantially limiting condition if one has (1) a physical or mental
impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is
treated by one's employer as constituting such limitation; (2) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others towards such
impairment; or (3) no physical or mental impairment as defined in the
Act, but is treated by one's employer as having a substantially limiting
impairment.37
M. Definitions of Disability Compared
Some of the terms in the ADA and the DDA are similar in
regards to both definition and practical effect. For example,
"physical or mental impairment" is a phrase common to the definition
of disabled in both statutes. '3 The DDA's term "substantial adverse
132. See id.
133. 480 U.S. at 281.
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1). See also Holihan 87 F.3d at 366.
135. Arline, 480 U.S. at 283.
136. Id. at 284.
137. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l).
138. Compare Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, Ch. 50, sched. 1 § 1 (1) (Eng.)
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effect"'39 also appears to run somewhat parallel to its ADA
counterpart "substantially limits."'' Under the DDA, "substantial
adverse effect" is used to indicate an effect that is more than trivial.141
The DDA's phrase "substantially limits" involves a comparison of the
ability of an able-bodied individual and a disabled individual to
perform a major life activity.142  However, as explored below,
important differences remain that highlight the weaknesses of the
DDA as compared to the ADA.143
A. "Regarded as" and "Record of" Provisions
The absence in the DDA of any provisions for individuals who
are regarded as having a disability or for those with a record of a
disability is the most glaring difference between the DDA and the
ADA.'44 That the definition of disability in the DDA is purely in the
present tense, and thus does not include an individual with a history
of disability, is determined by the verb "has" in the critical clause: "a
person has a disability for the purposes of this Act if he has a physical
or mental impairment.' 4' Thus, if an individual is discriminated
against because he or she had cancer in the past, but is now cured, this
individual is protected under the ADA but not under the DDA.
Under the DDA, when an impairment ceases to have a substantial
adverse effect, it is to be treated as having that effect if it is likely to
recur.'46 This provision goes some way towards the protection of
those individuals with a record of disability, but only if the
impairment is likely to recur. The provision thus does not necessarily
protect an individual, now cured, who once had cancer unless
recurrence is likely. Also, the DDA does not protect an employee
with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990).
139. Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, Ch. 50, sched. 1 § 1 (1) (Eng.).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
141. 265 H.C. OFFIcIAL REP. (6th ser.) 174 (Oct. 31, 1995) (statement of Alistair
Burt, Minister for Social Security and Disabled People).
142. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1).
143. The DDA is more progressive than the ADA in at least one respect,
however, in that the DDA does not consider mitigating measures, other than
corrective lenses, when considering whether an impairment is substantial.
144. Compare Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50, sched. 1 § 1 (1) (Eng.)
with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
145. Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50, sched. 1 § 1 (1) (Eng.) (emphasis
added).
146. Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, h. 50, sched. 1 § 1 (1) 2-(2) (Eng.).
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with cancer who does not yet suffer symptoms from the disease.147
Nor would it protect an individual with asymptomatic HIV.' 18 These
individuals would, however, be protected by the ADA.
Similarly, an individual erroneously regarded as having a
disability does not come within the definition of disability in the
DDA because that individual would not have an impairment as
defined in the Act. The EEOC, however, gives the following example
as an illustration of how the "regarded as" provision might apply
under the ADA:
[A]n employer discharged an employee in response to a rumor that
the employee is infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus....
Even though the rumor is totally unfounded and the individual has
no impairment at all, the individual is considered an individual with
a disability because the employer perceived of this individual as
being disabled.
149
In contrast, an individual regarded as having HIV would not be
protected under the DDA because neither would he or she be
presently impaired nor would a recurrence of the impairment be
likely since it never existed in the first place.
The limited definition of disability in the DDA, as compared
with the definition in the ADA, almost certainly excludes from the
ambit of the DDA large numbers of potential applicants who have
been discriminated against because they have been perceived as
disabled. However, the tripartite definition of disability in the ADA
does not only apply to three different types of plaintiff. The tripartite
definition of disability also effectively provides a potential plaintiff
with three chances to meet the definition of disabled when trying to
establish a prima facie case."' Moreover, courts have also readily
embraced the approach. 5' In Holihan v. Lucky Stores, for example,
the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff, Holihan, did not have an
147. See Shaun Connolly, Action Ordered On Legal Loophole, EVENING MAIL
(U.K.), Aug. 23, 1999, at 6. Margaret Hodge, Minister for Employment, has asked
the Disability Rights Task Force to consider this issue for its upcoming review of the
DDA. See id.; see also Robert Shrimsley, Sacking Ban For Cancer Victims, DAILY
TEL. (U.K.), Aug. 23, 1999, at 2.
148. See Peter Pallot, Special Report: HIV, DAILY TEL. (London), Dec. 1, 1997, at
28.
149. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o.
150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Holihan, 87 F.3d at 362.
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impairment that substantially limited any of his major life activities.52
However, the court held that there was an issue of material fact as to
whether Holihan had been regarded as disabled.'53 Holihan had had
two meetings with his management; at the first, Holihan was asked if
he was having any problems, and at the second, he was encouraged to
seek counseling.'m The court concluded that a reasonable jury could
infer that the management had regarded Holihan as suffering from a
disabling mental condition that substantially limited his ability to
work.55 Thus, when an individual cannot meet the first definition of
disability under the ADA, he or she may be able to meet either or
both of the "record of" or "regarded as" provisions. Under the
DDA, such an individual would not have a second or third chance to
benefit from the Act's protection of the disabled.
The concept of impairment under the ADA transcends that of a
purely physical impairment. The Act acknowledges that an
impairment can effectively result from the misconceived attitudes of
society.5 6 Both the "record of' and "regarded as" provisions address
these concerns."' The DDA is almost entirely lacking in this regard.
The ADA is more open-ended than the DDA as it defines
disability more broadly. At the same time, the ADA is more
stringent than the DDA as it protects only those individuals who are
otherwise qualified for particular jobs. The ADA structure is
intuitive. Under the DDA, otherwise qualified individuals regarded
as disabled or with a record of disability may be discriminated against,
whereas such individuals are covered under the ADA.
B. "Otherwise Qualified" provisions
Under the ADA, an individual must be a qualified individual
with a disability.5 8 A qualified individual with a disability is one who
can perform the essential functions of the position with or without
reasonable accommodations. 9  Thus, the definition of disability
under the ADA is linked to an extent with an individual's ability to
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 283.
157. See id.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
159. See id.
1999]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
do the job concerned and is highly fact specific. However, the
definition of disability in the DDA does not take into account an
individual's ability to do the job concerned with or without
reasonable adjustments."W Thus, on this issue, the DDA appears to
have the broader definition as it does not appear to limit protection to
individuals who are qualified. However, under the DDA, an
employer can treat an individual with a disability less favorably
provided it is justified. 6' One would assume that less favorable
treatment may be justified if the individual with a disability is not
qualified. However, the key difference concerns the burden of proof.
Under the ADA, it is the plaintiff's burden to show that he or she is
otherwise qualified.62 Indeed, such a showing is part of the plaintiff's
prima facie burden of establishing that he or she is an individual with
a disability who can perform the essential functions of the position
with or without reasonable accommodations.' Under the DDA,
however, it is the employer's burden to show that the less favorable
treatment shown an individual with a disability is justified.16 The
difference may thus ultimately be one of procedure, but it is
significant nonetheless.
C. "Normal Day-to-Day Activities" and "Major Life Activity"
At first blush, it appears that the phrase "normal day-to-day
activities" in the DDA represents a broader definition than the
corresponding phrase in the ADA, "major life activity." The ADA
term "major" suggests a more restrictive type of activity than the
DDA term "normal." Likewise, the ADA term "life" suggests a
more restrictive type of activity than the DDA term "day-to-day."
However, as noted above, the phrase "normal day-to-day activities" is
given an exclusive definition in the DDA. In contrast, the ADA
provides a non-exclusive list of major life activities. Both the EEOC
and the courts can thus supplement the enumerated major life
activities in the ADA. This flexible interpretation has allowed for a
broader, more inclusive definition of "major life activity" under the
ADA than would be possible for "normal day-to-day activities"
under the DDA. For example, in a decision that considered whether
160. Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50, sched. 1 § 1 (1) (Eng.).
161. Id. sched. 2 § 5 (1).
162. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).
163. See id.
164. See Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, ch. 50, sched. 2 § 5 (1) (Eng.).
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asymptomatic HIV was a disability, the Supreme Court held that
reproduction is a major life activity under the ADA.'6' Such a
decision would not, however, be possible under the DDA because
reproduction is not listed as a normal day-to-day activity. Indeed,
one would be hard pressed to find a normal day-to-day activity that
would be impacted by an impairment such as asymptomatic HIV.
The all-inclusive list of normal day-to-day activities in the DDA
has led, or could lead, to anomalies in the case law. For example, if
an individual can perform day-to-day activities but not activities
required in his or her job, that individual is not disabled under the
DDA. In contrast, the ADA includes work as a major life activity
and would protect such an individual in regards to a class of or a
broad range of jobs. Indeed, it seems somewhat remarkable that the
DDA provisions designed to protect disabled individuals from
discrimination in the workplace would not include work as a normal
day-to-day activity.
Many of the DDA's enumerated normal day-to-day activities, if
impaired, would affect a disabled individual's ability to work. For
example, if the normal day-to-day activities of concentrating or
learning are impaired, these would affect a disabled individual's
ability to work in a broad range of jobs. Moreover, the major life
activity of working is not the best major life activity for a plaintiff to
use under the ADA. As noted earlier, the major life activity of
working is subject to a more rigorous definition of the phrase
"substantially limits."'6
However, the absence of work as a normal day-to-day activity
has provided employers in Great Britain with a loophole in certain
circumstances. The problem is compounded by the restricted
definitions given to some of the enumerated normal day-to-day
activities. For example, under the ADA, "lifting" is considered a
major life activity. The DDA, however, qualifies "lifting" by
requiring the normal day-to-day activity of lifting to be in relation to
everyday objects which has been held to not include heavy bags. The
EEOC, however, notes that:
[A]n individual who has a back condition that prevents the
individual from performing any heavy labor job would be
substantially limited in the major life activity of working because
the individual's impairment eliminates his or her ability to perform
165. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
166. See Holihan, 87 F.3d at 366; see also Price, 966 F. Supp. at 419.
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a class of jobs.' 6'
It remains true such an individual would have to be otherwise
qualified but this qualification considers whether or not the individual
can perform the work with or without reasonable accommodation. A
reasonable accommodation for an individual whose impairment
prevents him or her from lifting heavy objects may involve the
provision of equipment such as a cart or trolley.
IV. Conclusion
Although the DDA is probably the most progressive disability
discrimination legislation in Europe, the Act compares poorly with its
American counterpart, the ADA. Several of the elements in the
definition of "disability" under the two statutes are very similar.
However, unlike the ADA, the DDA does not protect individuals
who are regarded as having a disability or those with a record of a
disability. Individuals who are discriminated against because of a
history of disability or because they are perceived as disabled are
therefore not protected by the DDA. The DDA does not recognize
the concept, embodied in the ADA, that one may be impaired by
virtue of societal attitudes rather than physical limitations. Even
individuals who have impairments under the DDA are not protected
as vigorously as their counterparts under the ADA. They are less
likely to be considered disabled because of the fact that the phrase
"normal day-to-day activities," as defined under the DDA, is subject
to a less flexible interpretation than is the term "major life activities"
under the ADA. The fact that work is not listed as a normal day-to-
day activity has provided employers in Great Britain with a loophole.
The inflexible nature of the phrase "normal day-to-day activities" is
also exacerbated by the restricted definitions given to some of the
enumerated normal day-to-day activities.
If the limitations of the DDA are to be overcome, the British
government task force must reconsider the definition of "disability"
as it conducts its review of the Act. The task force should consider in
particular the absence of any "regarded as" or "record of" provisions.
However, the definitions given "normal day-to-day activities" and the
exhaustive treatment of the phrase are also ripe for review.
167. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20).
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